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1. INTRODUCTION
Many recent studies have explored the relationship between income dis-
tribution and economic growth (see, for example, Alesina and Rodrik, 1994,
Persson and Tabellini, 1994), without examining the impact of income dis-
tribution on savings. This is unfortunate because savings and investment
are the driving force of economic growth, and a detailed examination of the
relationship between savings and income distribution should proceed be-
fore any systematic study on the impact of income distribution on income
growth. Our current study intends to ﬁll up this missing gap.
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The literature on savings behavior is enormous. For a detailed survey, see
Aghevli et al. (1990). In general empirical evidence shows that countries
with a high savings rate, such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are
typically associated with high growth rates. Kessler et al. (1993) discuss
the savings behavior in 17 OECD countries. They ﬁnd that a large part
of the variation in savings behavior van be attributed to the variation
across countries. Masson et al. (1995) look at a broad set of possible
determinants of savings, such as income growth, ﬁnancial liberalization,
interest rates, terms of trade, and apply them to savings data for a large
number of industrial and developing countries. Edwards (1995) studies the
determinants of savings for a panel of 36 countries and discusses the cross
country diﬀerences in the saving ratios. His main results show that per
capita income growth, political instability and ﬁnancial development are
important determinants of savings.
This paper traces the impact of income distribution on savings both
analytically and empirically, thereby adding an important dimension to
previous studies on savings. This task is timely because income distribution
has received an enormous amount of attention recently, and has been made
much easier using an improved data set on income distribution compiled
by Deininger and Squire (1996). Previous empirical studies on income
distribution have been hampered by data sets with very diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of the Gini coeﬃcients and very few observations over time and across
countries. Using this newly compiled and greatly expanded data set on
income distribution, we can minimize the methodological diﬀerences in
the deﬁnitions of Gini coeﬃcients by selecting the Gini coeﬃcients from
national coverage household survey based on gross income, net income or
expenditure. Since we have explicit information on the deﬁnitions of Gini
coeﬃcients, we are able to control the diﬀerences in measuring income
distribution based on diﬀerent criteria and maintain consistency in the
deﬁnitions of Gini coeﬃcients.
Using the new data set, we found by variance decomposition analysis
that income distribution is relatively stable within each country over time,
but is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across countries. Because savings rates also
vary signiﬁcantly across countries, it is only natural to ask whether this
variation has anything to do with the large variation in income distribution
and other structural variables such as the initial income distribution, school
attainment, ﬁnancial development, and the civil liberty index.
Section 2 brieﬂy discusses the patterns of savings and income distribu-
tion. Section 3 presents an analytical model explaining the relationship
between savings and income distribution. Section 4 empirically examine
the relationship between savings and income distribution after controlling
the eﬀects on savings of income growth, the interest rate, ﬁnancial devel-
opment, and the political system. Section 5 concludes.SAVINGS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 247
2. PATTERNS OF SAVINGS BEHAVIOR AND INCOME
DISTRIBUTION
We ﬁrst study the empirical patterns of savings behavior and income
distribution in a panel of 49 industrial and developing countries. The sav-
ings rate is deﬁned in three ways based on available data. In particular,
SR is the ratio of gross domestic savings (GDS) to gross domestic product
(GDP), NSR is the ratio of gross national savings (GNS) to gross domestic
product, and NSRP is the ratio of domestic private savings (GNPS) to
gross domestic product. For the sources and descriptions of the data, see
the Data Appendix.
The data for SR for most of the countries in our sample cover a period
from 1960 to 1992. For NSR and NSRP the coverage is from 1970 to
1990. The income distribution data (Gini coeﬃcients from 1947 to 1994)
are taken from Deininger and Squire (1996). For most of the countries the
number of valid observations of the Gini coeﬃcient is usually small. The
summary statistics of the savings rates and Gini coeﬃcients are presented
in Table 1.1
TABLE 1.
Summary Statistics of Savings Rates and Gini Coeﬃcients for 49 Countries
COUNTRY Obs. # MEAN STDE MAX MIN MAX-MIN COVERAGE
SR 1473 23.53 8.02 55.15 −3.29 58.54 1960 ∼ 92
NSR 1127 22.51 8.42 47.55 −3.86 51.41 1970 ∼ 92
NSRP 913 19.33 7.46 43.70 −8.79 52.49 1970 ∼ 92
GINI 556 36.09 9.03 61.88 18.44 43.44 1947 ∼ 94
For NSRP no data is available for BHS, BGR, CHN, CRI, JAM and PAN.
A direct visual inspection of the plot of the savings rate and the Gini
coeﬃcient data reveals trends in the savings rate or the Gini coeﬃcient
time series for some of the countries. Thus we estimate a simple linear
trend model to test the trends in the savings rate
Sit = αi + βit + uit (1)
where Sit (= SRit,NSRit, or NSRPit) is the savings rate; uit ∼ iid(0,σ2
u).
Due to the diﬀerences in the deﬁnitions for the Gini coeﬃcients, we use
a least squares dummy variables (LSDV) regression instead
Giniit = φiDi + θiti +
X
kλkDctrl,k + ωit (2)
1For detailed analysis on the explanation of the variations of income inequality across
countries and over time, see Li, Squire, and Zou (1998). The summary statistics are also
available for each country upon request.248 HONGYI LI AND HENG-FU ZOU
where Giniit is the Gini coeﬃcient, Di = 1 for country i/0 otherwise,
and ω ∼ iid(0,σ2
ω). The dummy variables Dctrl,k (k = 1,2,3) control
for the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the Gini coeﬃcient in the original sources.
The control dummies are deﬁned as Dctrl,1 = 1 if gross income based/0
otherwise; Dctrl,2 = 1 if net income based/0 otherwise; and Dctrl,3 = 1 if
household based/0 otherwise. In both (1) and (2) i = 1,2,...,N (number
of countries) and ti = 1,2,...,Ti (number of years covered).2
Tables 2 and 3 present the trend estimation results. For the savings
rate, a large proportion of the countries have signiﬁcant trends. For SR,
21 countries have signiﬁcant negative trends and 19 countries have sig-
niﬁcant positive trends; for NSR, 18 have signiﬁcant negative trends and
16 have signiﬁcant positive trends; for NSRP, 11 have signiﬁcant negative
trends and 14 have signiﬁcant positive trends. For NSRP only 40 countries
are considered in the trend estimation due to data availability. Almost
all the OECD countries in our sample have signiﬁcant negative trends,
compared to most Asian countries, or in general the developing countries,
which exhibit signiﬁcant positive trends in savings rates. Recent compara-
tive studies of broad trends in savings behavior can be found in Shafer, et
al. (1992), Maddison (1992), among other authors.
For the Gini coeﬃcients, the number of countries that have signiﬁcant
trends is smaller. See results in Table 3. Only half of the countries have
signiﬁcant trends, although the results are highly tentative because the
time series of the Gini coeﬃcients have few and non-consecutive observa-
tions. In the LSDV regression for the Gini coeﬃcients, deﬁnition dummies
are included to count for the systematic diﬀerences in measuring income
distribution. The general pattern of income distribution is relatively stable
within a country and varies signiﬁcantly across countries. The estimation
results indicate that Gini coeﬃcients based on gross income are signiﬁ-
cantly higher (4 points on a scale of 1 to 100) than Gini coeﬃcients based
on the other deﬁnitions such as net income or expenditure. Thus in our
empirical analysis in section 4, the deﬁnition-adjusted Gini coeﬃcients are
used instead.
3. THE ANALYTICAL AMBIGUITIES ON SAVINGS,
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
Analytically the relationship between income distribution and savings
has been studied since the classical contributions by Lewis (1954), Kaldor
(1957) and Pasinetti (1962). But in most of these models, the savings be-
havior of diﬀerent social groups and classes is assumed to be very diﬀerent in
2Lagged values can be added in the trend regressions for savings rate and Gini coef-
ﬁcients to test for serial correlation. Because of missing data in the Gini series, we do
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TABLE 2.
Trend Estimation for Savings Rates
SR NSR NSRP
COUNTRY NOB TREND t-VALUE NOB TREND t-VALUE NOB TREND t-VALUE
AUS 33 −0.19 −5.46 23 −0.21 −3.97 23 −0.21 −4.61
BHS 11 1.08 3.42 23 0.19 0.80
BGD 20 0.15 2.08 23 0.22 3.72 23 0.30 3.63
BEL 33 −0.07 −1.34 23 −0.32 −3.00 23 0.08 1.60
BRA 33 0.23 5.75 23 0.09 1.07 23 −0.08 −0.76
BGR 12 −0.76 −2.69 23 −0.88 −7.58
CAN 33 −0.10 −2.91 23 −0.35 −6.59 23 0.03 0.50
CHL 33 0.30 3.20 23 0.82 4.49 23 1.00 8.32
CHN 16 0.69 10.26 23 0.01 0.07
COL 33 0.20 5.13 23 0.06 0.59 23 −0.10 −1.06
CRI 33 0.42 7.83 23 0.59 5.03
CIV 32 −0.36 −4.36 23 −2.25 −14.97 23 −1.50 −6.56
CSK 12 −0.66 −2.89 23 −0.15 −3.53 23 −0.20 −9.26
FIN 33 −0.09 −2.20 23 −0.88 −8.78 23 0.22 1.89
FRA 33 −0.23 −7.59 23 −0.32 −6.35 23 −0.13 −3.64
DFA 33 −0.16 −3.99 23 −0.12 −1.82 23 0.10 2.40
HND 33 0.05 0.78 23 0.13 0.97
HKG 32 0.40 7.66 23 0.73 7.76 12 0.71 3.12
HUN 23 −0.46 −5.56 23 −0.81 −7.02
IND 33 0.32 13.36 23 0.13 2.18 23 0.21 3.48
IDN 33 1.00 8.60 23 0.85 9.25
IRN 19 −0.76 −2.96 23 −0.55 −2.71 23 −0.52 −2.75
ITA 33 −0.31 −15.73 23 −0.38 −11.09 23 −0.18 −3.97
JAM 33 −0.30 −2.55 23 0.29 1.99
JPN 33 −0.13 −2.88 23 −0.19 −2.49 23 −0.32 −13.19
KOR 33 1.13 25.67 23 0.99 9.38 23 0.78 8.04
MYS 33 0.35 6.39 23 0.51 4.64 23 0.65 5.14
MEX 33 0.23 4.58 23 0.26 2.27 23 0.22 1.66
NLD 33 −0.18 −5.00 23 −0.14 −1.81 23 0.24 4.25
NZL 33 −0.11 −2.89 23 −0.64 −4.44 23 −0.41 −2.17
NOR 33 0.03 0.75 23 −0.16 −1.92 23 −0.02 −0.25
PAK 33 0.11 2.37 23 0.45 4.14 23 0.62 6.64
PAN 33 0.14 1.78 23 −0.64 −6.57
PER 33 −0.78 −5.89 23 −0.22 −1.45 23 0.22 1.26
PHL 33 0.03 0.61 23 −0.02 −0.33 23 −0.17 −2.48
POL 13 0.32 0.54 23 −0.13 −0.84 23 −0.03 −0.22
PRT 33 0.03 0.42 23 0.90 8.33 23 0.92 8.95
SGP 33 1.56 19.48 23 1.40 8.86 23 1.31 9.34
ESP 33 −0.16 −5.81 23 −0.09 −1.92 23 −0.12 −2.45
LKA 33 0.05 1.09 23 0.47 4.83 23 0.45 4.37
SWE 33 −0.23 −6.88 23 −0.30 −4.46 23 0.09 1.26
TWN 33 0.56 6.38 23 0.29 2.58 16 0.21 0.71
THA 33 0.45 9.10 23 0.60 5.10 23 0.36 4.49
TTO 33 −0.17 −1.18 23 −1.47 −9.02 23 0.12 0.95
TUN 32 0.23 3.63 23 0.06 0.53 23 0.77 6.30
GBR 33 −0.08 −2.92 23 −0.35 −9.31 23 −0.10 −1.51
USA 33 −0.15 −6.44 23 −0.21 −4.26 23 −0.09 −2.19
VEN 33 −0.65 −5.71 23 −0.36 −1.79 23 0.11 0.64
YUG 30 0.34 3.22 23 −0.02 −0.22 23 −0.04 −0.40
1. For SR, 21 countries have signiﬁcant negative trends, 19 countries have signiﬁcant positive trends. (A
total of 40 countries have signiﬁcant trends.) A 5% t-test is used. Same below.
2. For NSR, 18 countries have signiﬁcant negative trends, 16 countries have signiﬁcant positive trends.
(A total of 34 countries have signiﬁcant trends.)
3. For NSRP, 11 countries have signiﬁcant negative trends, 14 countries have signiﬁcant positive trends. (A
total of 25 countries have signiﬁcant trends.) For HND, HUN and IDN, since the number of observations
is small, the results are not reported.250 HONGYI LI AND HENG-FU ZOU
TABLE 3.
LSDV Estimation (Gini Coeﬃcients )





Country Obs Estimate t-VALUE Estimate t-VALUE
AUS 10 31.09 26.26 0.02 0.15
BHS 11 42.23 35.80 −0.30 −3.78
BGD 9 31.43 24.60 0.13 1.37
BEL 9 31.93 26.83 −0.44 −4.45
BRA 14 53.57 52.91 −0.08 −0.84
BGR 27 19.21 19.74 0.15 3.13
CAN 23 26.63 24.90 −0.03 −0.86
CHL 15 47.86 43.57 0.34 4.04
CHN 12 23.57 15.20 0.79 4.72
COL 7 46.81 38.01 0.05 0.50
CRI 8 41.81 35.44 −0.23 −2.51
CIV 5 39.11 9.69 0.06 0.11
CSK 10 19.29 14.60 −0.18 −2.47
FIN 9 28.47 22.46 0.23 1.72
FRA 7 34.88 23.05 −0.46 −5.40
DEU 8 32.76 26.70 0.36 4.06
HND 6 52.96 37.02 −0.36 −3.59
HKG 10 38.45 31.28 −0.14 −2.20
HUN 8 23.00 18.18 0.12 1.60
IND 29 31.26 59.22 −0.10 −3.29
IDN 7 34.99 39.59 −0.30 −1.79
IRN 6 42.82 28.50 −0.07 −0.39
ITA 15 33.45 27.02 −0.37 −3.44
JAM 5 44.49 45.74 −0.21 −2.64
JPN 22 29.77 26.25 −0.07 −1.18
KOR 10 30.78 24.82 0.14 1.61
MYS 6 45.75 35.83 −0.16 −1.21
MEX 9 43.93 32.87 −0.33 −5.49
NLD 10 25.13 15.51 0.33 1.83
NZL 11 28.29 24.43 0.30 2.40
NOR 9 31.91 25.54 −0.20 −2.54
PAK 12 30.90 29.11 −0.09 −1.35
PAN 4 48.28 34.76 −0.01 −0.06
PER 5 46.13 37.67 −0.55 −4.46
PHL 7 38.99 32.47 −0.03 −0.50
POL 8 23.54 14.84 0.02 0.11
PRT 4 33.79 22.39 −0.22 −1.56
SGP 6 35.66 26.98 0.02 0.09
ESP 8 26.83 27.98 −0.21 −2.08
LKA 9 35.25 35.27 −0.27 −3.96
SWE 15 28.99 25.54 −0.10 −1.00
TWN 26 28.01 24.15 −0.02 −0.44
THA 8 40.90 33.55 0.31 4.23
TTO 4 40.53 22.96 −0.14 −1.19
TUN 5 42.61 45.16 −0.04 −0.40
GBR 31 25.11 21.64 0.18 4.38
USA 45 31.53 30.03 0.06 2.58
VEN 8 38.08 31.35 0.25 1.70
YUG 4 30.20 21.74 0.22 2.09
14 countries have signiﬁcant negative trend, 11 countries have signiﬁcant positive
trend. (A total of 25 countries has signiﬁcant trends.) A 5% t-test is used.SAVINGS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 251
an ad hoc manner. For example, Lewis (1954) assumes that entrepreneurs
save a larger fraction of their proﬁt income than the other groups in the
economy; Kaldor (1957) takes the savings rate of the working class to be
zero. Thus income inequalities can generate high savings rate if the rich
have a larger share of income in an economy. Until now this line of research
has not been seriously developed or tested empirically.
In this section, we develop an analytical model to illustrate how income
distribution aﬀects savings through both the life-cycle permanent-income
argument and the political-economy mechanism. We will see that, unlike
the ad hoc models, it is very diﬃcult to derive a deﬁnite relationship be-
tween income distribution and savings from sound microfoundations.
Consider a typical overlapping-generations model. Member h (h = 1,...,
H(t)) born at time t has a utility function deﬁned on his/her consumption
when young, ch
t (t), his/her consumption when old, ch
t (t + 1), public con-




t (t + 1),g(t),g(t + 1)). (3)
His/her budget constraint is given by
ch
t (t) + sh
t (t) = ωh
t (t) (4)
ch
t (t + 1) = (1 − τ(t))(1 + r)sh
t (t) (5)
where sh
t (t) is his/her savings when he/she is young, ωh
t (t) is his/her initial
income, τ(t) is the rate of capital income taxation on generation t, r is the
exogenously given interest rate on savings. H(t) is the total population of
generation t. Public consumption is ﬁnanced by the government through
capital income taxation with g(t) levied on the time t old and g(t+1) levied




τ(t − 1)(1 + r)sh
t−1(t − 1) (6)





where H(t − 1) and H(t) are the numbers of people of generations t and
(t + 1), respectively.
In this setup, agent h has a savings decision to make in order to smooth
consumption over time. The savings by agent h will be determined by
his/her preferences, initial income distribution, capital income taxation,252 HONGYI LI AND HENG-FU ZOU
interest rate, and government spending. Without simply assuming away
the decision of public spending, we follow the political economy arguments
in Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Perroti
(1993), and propose a voting mechanism on public goods: each agent max-
imizes his/her utility deﬁned on both private and public goods by choosing
the most desired rate of capital income tax. Of course, his/her choices will
be in turn determined by various factors mentioned above, in particular,
initial income. Then the society’s collective choice through the majority
voting will be determined by its income distribution and other factors.
To see this more clearly, let us ﬁrst solve agent h’s consumption and sav-
ings problem. Given the choices of g(t) and g(t+1), agent h’s optimization
yields the following ﬁrst-order condition:
∂ uh
t (ωh
t (t) − sh
t (t),(1 − τ(t))(1 + r)sh






t (t) − sh
t (t),(1 − τ(t))(1 + r)sh
t (t),g(t),g(t + 1))
∂ ch
t (t + 1)
(1 − τ(t))(1 + r).
From this condition, we have
sh
t (t) = sh
t (ωh
t (t),(1 − τ(t))(1 + r),g(t),g(t + 1)). (8)
By summing savings by the time t young, we have the total savings at








t (t),(1 − τ(t))(1 + r),g(t),g(t + 1)). (9)
At this general level, we have the following general result: If, in both



















t (t)2 < 0, then a more equal distribution leads to higher
savings because the marginal savings rate from income is decreasing; on






t (t)2 > 0, a more unequal distribution will lead







t (t)2 = 0, then it does not matter how income is distributed
among the members of the society.
Next, we turn to the political-economy argument for the determination
of the tax rate and public service provision. We assume that every memberSAVINGS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 253






t (t) − sh
t (t),(1 − τ(t))(1 + r)sh
t (t),g(t),g(t + 1))
subject to (6), (7) and (8). The society will determine the tax rate τ(t)
by the majority rule. This choice of the tax rate is necessarily determined
by each voter’s income share among his/her generation, or more generally,





As in Alesina and Rodrik (1994), when income distribution for this econ-
omy is more equal, the median voter’s income share is higher. Since the
tax rate is linked to the median voter’s income share, therefore, income
distribution aﬀects the chosen tax rate. It should be noted that with our
preference structure and government budget constraint the time t young
determine g(t+1) and τ(t) while the time t old determine g(t) and τ(t−1).
Since the interest-rate eﬀect on savings is ambiguous as a result of in-
come and substitution eﬀects, we cannot predict the eﬀect of capital income
taxation on savings at this general level. From this observation, it is imme-
diately apparent that a high capital income tax may increase or decrease
savings by agent h when he/she is young. This is to say, a higher or a
lower tax rate as a result of income distribution has an ambiguous impact
on savings by the young.
At any time t, the time t young save while the time t old just consume
what they have saved plus the after-tax return. Thus, the aggregate savings







h=1 ), population (H(t − 1), H(t)),
interest rate (r), and capital income tax (τ({ωh
t (t)}
H(t)































In this deﬁnition, we see clearly that both intergenerational and in-
tragenerational income distribution can aﬀect the aggregate savings rate
not only through pure economic reasoning, but also through the political-254 HONGYI LI AND HENG-FU ZOU








Equation (11) provides the fundamental analytical result for our empir-
ical examination of the impact of income distribution on savings across
countries. To make it empirically operational, we take the following ap-
proximation:
S(t) = S(Gini(t),∆(t),r(t),λ(t),p(t)) (12)
where Gini(t) is the Gini coeﬃcient of household income, as a measure of












1); r(t) is the interest rate; λ(t) is a measure of ﬁnancial development; and
p(t) is a measure of political systems.
It should be noted that we have incorporated λ(t) and p(t) to the savings-
rate function. This is important because savings are mobilized through
the ﬁnancial structure and taxation is determined and implemented in a
particular political system. In diﬀerent political regimes, even the majority
rule on taxation will function diﬀerently; see Edwards (1995) for more
arguments on this point.
As argued earlier, in general it is not possible to make deﬁnite theoretical
predictions on the eﬀects of income distribution on savings. To make this
point clear, we oﬀer two examples that shed light on our understanding of
the relationship between savings and income distribution.
Example 1: Savings are independent of income distribution
All agents (h = 1,...,H(t)) have an identical preference, and agent h
chooses consumption to maximize
α1 lnch
t (t) + α2 lnch
t (t + 1) + β1 lng(t) + β2 lng(t + 1)
subject to the budget constraint in (4) and (5) and with given g(t) and
g(t+1). Since the preference is homothetic, it is well-known that agent h’s
savings are linear in his/her income. Therefore, the economy’s aggregate
savings rate is independent of income distribution.
To determine the rate of capital income taxation, we assume a major-
ity rule. In this case, each agent h maximizes his/her utility by choosing
his/her most preferred tax rate. It is also well-known that, with a homo-
thetic preference structure, all voters will want the same tax rate (Lovell,
1975). Thus the optimal choice of income tax rate is also independent of
income distribution.
Example 2: Savings depend on income distribution indirectly
through income taxation
In example 1, let the common preference be changed to:
α1 lnch
t (t) + α2ch
t (t + 1) + β1 lng(t) + β2g(t + 1).SAVINGS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 255
Then the savings for agent h become
sh
t (t) = ωh
t (t) −
α1
α2(1 + r)(1 − τ)
.
Now, each individual’s savings are still linear in his/her income. For a
given tax rate, the savings rate will be independent of income distribution








t (t) + (1 + r)
P
ωh
t−1(t − 1) − α1
α2(1−τ)H(t − 1)
.
But unlike example 1, each individual’s savings are decreasing in the






α2(1 + r)(1 − τ)2 < 0.
To determine τ by the society, we ﬁrst examine each individual’s pre-
ferred capital income tax. With the required substitution of the savings
function in the budget constraint and the revenue constraint of the govern-
ment in the utility function, we have the following ﬁrst-order condition for
agent h’s optimal choice of τh:
α1
(1 − τh)
− α2(1 + r)ωh






α2(1 + r)(1 − τh)2 = 0.
























α2(1 + r)(1 − τh)2W(t)/H(t)
= 0.
To ﬁnd out how agent h’s choice of τh changes with respect to his/her
income share σh






2(1 + r)2(1 − τh)3W(t)
α1α2(1 + r)(1 − τh) − 2β2α1H(t)
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Therefore, if α1α2(1+r)(1−τh)−2β2α1H(t) > 0, then dτ
h
dσh
t (t) > 0; and
if α1α2(1 + r)(1 − τh) − 2β2α1H(t) < 0, then dτ
h
dσh
t (t) < 0. With majority
voting on income taxation, the tax rate will be determined by the median
voter’s preferred choice. Let τm denote the optimal tax rate chosen by the
median voter and σm be the median voter’s income share. Then the tax






α2(1 + r)(1 − τm)2W(t)/H(t)
= 0.
Again, note that, as in Alesina and Rodrik (1994), more equal income
distribution implies a higher income share for the median voter. In this
case, income distribution aﬀects the choice of the optimal tax rate of the
median voter and the savings of the whole economy. If α1α2(1 + r)(1 −
τm) − 2β2α1H(t) < 0, and if the income distribution is more equal (i.e.,
a large income share for the median voter), the median voter will vote for
a smaller tax rate. Then everyone will save more. Hence a more equal
income distribution leads to a higher savings rate. On the other hand, if
α1α2(1+r)(1−τm)−2β2α1H(t) > 0, a more equal income distribution (a
larger income share for the median voter) will lead to more income taxation
and less savings.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our theory provides us with a framework identifying the main determi-
nants of savings, but predicts an ambiguous eﬀect of income distribution
on savings. In the examples we studied, more equal income distribution
can increase aggregate savings, decrease aggregate savings, or not aﬀect
aggregate savings. Thus it is important to ﬁnd out whether this ambiguity
between savings and income distribution still holds empirically. For this
purpose, we estimate a linear regression model based on (12):
Sit = αi+β1Giniit+β2GGRWit+β3Rit+β4FDPit+β5POLIit+εit (13)
for i = 1,2,...,N and t = 1,2,...,T, where N is the number of coun-
tries and T is the time period. In (13), the dependent variable Sit (=
SRit,NSRit or NSRPit)3 is the savings rate; εit ∼ iid(0,σ2
ε).4 The in-
dependent variables are: Giniit (Gini coeﬃcients adjusted for diﬀerences
3The savings rate s is limited to the range [0,1] (where negative savings is not consid-
ered). Simple least squares is inappropriate. A transformation of ln(s/(1 − s)) is used
in the regression analysis.
4Since the Gini coeﬃcients data for individual countries are in general time series with
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in deﬁnitions), GGRWit (per capita real GDP growth), Rit (real inter-
est rate), FDPit (ﬁnancial development or ﬁnancial depth measurement,
deﬁned as M2/GDP, where M2 is money (M1) plus quasi-money), and
POLIit (measure of political freedom, ranked from 1 to 7, with 1 for the
most politically free countries and 7 the least politically free ones). For a
description of the variables and their sources, see the Data Appendix.
The pooled regression (when assuming α1 = α2 = ··· = αN ) and ﬁxed-
eﬀects model are estimated. The ﬁxed-eﬀects model allows for country
speciﬁc eﬀects. Empirically, the evidence found in the literature regarding
variations across countries in savings behavior suggests both homogeneity
and heterogeneity. Carroll et al. (1994) ﬁnd no diﬀerence in savings be-
havior based on a study of Canada immigrants. Kessler, et al. (1993), on
the other hand, argue that, even within the 17 OECD countries, there is
no evidence of homogeneous savings behavior.
In our pooled regression, the OECD country dummy (ODM) and the
Asian country dummy (ADM) are included to account for the regional
eﬀects discussed in the general patterns of savings behavior. For the ﬁxed-
eﬀects model, the measure of political systems (averaged over time) is not
included as a regressor because it has no time variation. We also repeat the
estimations for subsamples of the OECD countries and the Asian countries.
The estimation results are summarized in Tables 4, 5, and 6 where the
dependent variable is SR, NSR or NSRP, respectively. Next, we discuss
these results in details.
4.1. The relationship between gross domestic savings rate (SR)
and income distribution
4.1.1. Complete sample estimation
Table 4 summarizes the empirical results regarding regression (13) for the
complete sample when the dependent variable is SR - the gross domestic
savings rate. Due to the lack of data on the other variables, some of the 49
countries are not included in the estimation. For the complete sample we
are left with 41 countries with 311 observations. For the pooled regression,
diﬀerent speciﬁcations (cases (1) to (4)) are used to test the stability of the
regression coeﬃcients. Case (5) gives the results from the estimation of the
ﬁxed-eﬀects model. For regression results involving the ﬁxed-eﬀects spec-
iﬁcation, there are indications that the ﬁxed-eﬀects hypothesis cannot be
rejected. However, given the fact that the current panel data is highly un-
balanced (for some countries there are only a few observations), regression
results based on the ﬁxed-eﬀects model should be explained with caution.
and causality, or lagged variables as instruments to account for possible endogeneity. See
similar work by Li and Zou (1998), Li, Xie, and Zou (2000), and Li, Xu, and Zou (2000).258 HONGYI LI AND HENG-FU ZOU
In all cases, including case (5) for the ﬁxed-eﬀects model, the estimates
of the Gini coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant. However, in four cases the signs
are negative, suggesting that high inequality leads to low savings rate.
The coeﬃcients on GDP growth are all positive and strongly signiﬁcant.
The positive impact of GDP growth on savings has also been found in
Masson et al. (1995) for a panel of 64 developing countries in a ﬁxed-eﬀects
model. However, for the 21 industrial countries in their study, a negative
(not signiﬁcant) coeﬃcient is found. It is diﬀerent from our results for
the OECD countries, which will be discussed in the next subsection. For
ﬁnancial depth, the coeﬃcients are all positive and signiﬁcant in all the
pooled regressions (1) to (4). Edwards (1995) obtains similar results for
private savings. In case (5), which allows for country speciﬁc eﬀects, the
coeﬃcient of ﬁnancial depth becomes negative although not signiﬁcant.
The signs of the coeﬃcients on the real interest rate could be either posi-
tive or negative, depending on whether the income eﬀect or the substitution
eﬀect dominants. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients are negative in cases (3) and
(5), and positive in (1), (2) and (4). In all cases, the coeﬃcients are not
signiﬁcant.
Please note that in case (1), political freedom has a signiﬁcant and pos-
itive coeﬃcient, which suggests that, in general, politically less free coun-
tries have higher savings rates. When we add the OECD and Asian country
dummies, the coeﬃcient of political freedom becomes insigniﬁcant. How-
ever, the coeﬃcient of the OECD dummy estimate is negative and sig-
niﬁcant, which essentially leads to the same conclusion since the OECD
countries are politically more free than other countries. The explaining
power clearly shifts to the OECD and Asian country dummies.
4.1.2. The OECD countries
We consider two special cases. The OECD country and the Asian coun-
try subsamples. As we know from the summary statistics, most of the
OECD countries have negative trends in savings rates, while almost all the
Asian countries have positive trends. This is also one of the stylized facts
often documented in the savings literature. For the OECD country sample,
the regressions are based on 15 countries with 180 observations. The GDP
growth has positive and signiﬁcant estimates, which are similar to the com-
plete sample. The ﬁnancial depth has positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
in the pooled regressions (cases (6) and (7)), while they are negative and
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The coeﬃcients for Gini remain insigniﬁcant and positive ranging from
0.43 to 0.59. For the OECD countries the political freedom index clearly
varies less, which could be the main reason for an insigniﬁcant but positive
coeﬃcient. The real interest rate has positive coeﬃcients in the pooled
regressions in cases (6) and (7). In the ﬁxed-eﬀects model, the coeﬃcient
is negative and signiﬁcant.
4.1.3. The Asian countries
For the Asian countries (cases (9) to (11)), the coeﬃcients for Gini range
from 0.05 to 0.88. Again, none of the coeﬃcients for Gini is signiﬁcant.
GDP growth is positive and signiﬁcant in all three cases. Financial depth
is positive in all three cases but not signiﬁcant in case (11). The coeﬃcients
of real interest rate are positive, though insigniﬁcant.
In this exercise, one result comes out quite strong. GDP growth is highly
correlated to the savings rate in all the three samples with diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations. In particular, we ﬁnd that the relationship between the
savings rate and the Gini coeﬃcient is weak and insigniﬁcant.
4.2. The relationship between gross national savings rate (NSR)
and income distribution
The parallel results using NSR as the dependent variable are reported in
Table 5. Because the coverage of NSR is from 1970 to 1992, the number of
observations is smaller than the corresponding cases in Table 4. Other dif-
ferences between SR and NSR can also be found in the summary statistics
reported in Table 1.5
Broadly speaking, the coeﬃcient estimates show a similar pattern when
compared with the results in Tables 4 and 5. We highlight some of the
major diﬀerences and similarities here. One major diﬀerence is that, for the
complete sample, Gini has all negative coeﬃcients and is strongly signiﬁcant
in cases (1) to (4). For the OECD country sample, the coeﬃcients in cases
(6) and (7) are negative, although still insigniﬁcant.
5The major diﬀerences between SR and NSR are the time coverage and methodology
in calculating the savings ratios. Note that NSR (gross domestic savings divided by
GNP, 1970-1992) is an International Monetary Fund (IMF) deﬁnition, while SR (1960-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5262 HONGYI LI AND HENG-FU ZOU
With respect to the other variables, the pattern is basically consistent.
The coeﬃcients of GDP growth are all positive and signiﬁcant except in
case (11), where it is less signiﬁcant. Real interest rate, again, has negative
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in case (8) for the OECD sample, but is not
signiﬁcant in any other cases.
4.3. The relationship between domestic private savings rate
(NSRP) and income distribution
Finally, we report in Table 6 the estimation results with respect to the
gross private savings rate (NSRP). The coverage of private savings rate is
the same as that of the gross national savings rate. Note that our the-
oretical model is more relevant to the private savings rate. Empirically,
income distribution data is based on national-level household-income sur-
veys. Perhaps it better describes the relationship between savings and
income distribution when we use the domestic private savings ratio.
For the complete sample, the Gini has negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
in cases (1) to (4), which indicates that higher inequality leads to lower
private savings. When we allow for country-speciﬁc eﬀects in case (5) the
coeﬃcient is positive, although insigniﬁcant. For the OECD sample, the
coeﬃcients are all positive but insigniﬁcant. In case (11) for the Asian
country sample, the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant when country
speciﬁc eﬀects are allowed.
Compared to Tables 4 and 5, GDP growth continues to have a strong pos-
itive impact on private savings rate; except for the Asian country sample,
the coeﬃcients are positive but insigniﬁcant. Financial depth has positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients except in cases of the ﬁxed-eﬀects model. For
the OECD country sample, ﬁnancial depth is negative and signiﬁcant when
we allow for country-speciﬁc eﬀects.
The real interest rate is insigniﬁcant in most of the cases except in case
(8) for the OECD sample, where it is negative and signiﬁcant. This result
is the same for all three measures of savings rate. For the OECD country
sample, a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between savings rate and







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5264 HONGYI LI AND HENG-FU ZOU
4.4. The relationship between the savings rate and the income
shares of the rich
As mentioned in section 3, many early studies on growth and income
distribution have assumed a larger savings rate for the rich than for the
middle class and the poor (see Kaldor, 1957, for an explicit mathematical
model). If this assumption is valid, an economy with a larger income share
for the rich should have a higher savings rate, other things given. To test
this classical hypothesis, we consider the following regression
Sit = αi +β1TOP20it +β2GGRWit +β3Rit +β4FDPit +β5POLIit +εit (14)
where TOP20 denotes the income share of the top 20 percent of the
population.
Tables 7 to 9 report the estimation results regarding the relationship
between the savings rate and the income shares of the rich (TOP20). Re-
gardless of whether SR, NSR or NSRP is used as the dependent variable,
the coeﬃcients of TOP20 are mostly insigniﬁcant, except in cases (4) and
(8) in Table 8. When SR is used, TOP20 has negative (insigniﬁcant) co-
eﬃcients for the complete sample. However, for the two subsamples the
coeﬃcients are all positive. See results in Table 7. As for the results in
Tables 8 and 9, except for the ﬁxed-eﬀects model, most of the coeﬃcients
are negative, although insigniﬁcant. These results seem to weakly suggest
that when the rich’s income share increases, the savings rate drops.
5. CONCLUSION
While this paper has emphasized the analytical ambiguity on the rela-
tionship between savings and income inequality, the empirical examination
has rendered some weak support for a negative association between the
savings rate and income inequality. In particular, with the complete, world
sample, a negative and signiﬁcant relationship exists between NSR (or
NSRP) - the gross national (or private) savings rate - and the Gini coef-
ﬁcient. This ﬁnding implies that income inequality lowers savings across
countries worldwide, and it is in line with the negative relationship between
inequality and economic growth found by Alesina and Rodrik (1994); and
Persson and Tabellini (1994). But this ﬁnding is not very robust. In partic-
ular, with the subsamples of OECD countries and Asian countries, income





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2268 HONGYI LI AND HENG-FU ZOU
It is also interesting to note that our empirical estimation on the relation-
ship between the income share of the rich and the savings rate does not
in general support the classical Kaldor hypothesis: that a larger income
share for the rich increases the aggregate savings rate. To some degree, we
have found some evidence for something just the opposite: a larger income
share for the rich lowers the private savings rate.
APPENDIX: DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES
Variable Source
(1) Gross domestic savings rate (SR) World Bank, National Account, various issues.
(2) Gross national savings rate (NSR) IMF, World Economic Outlook, various issues.
(3) Domestic private savings rate (NSRP) IMF, World Economic Outlook, various issues.
(4) Gini coeﬃcients (GINI) Deininger and Squire (1996).
(5) Per capita GDP growth (GGRW) World Bank, Social Indicators, various issues.
(6) Real interest rate R Deﬁned as:
R = nominal interest rate − inﬂation rate
(7) Nominal interest rate IMF, International Financial Statistics,
various issues.
(8) Inﬂation rate IMF, International Financial Statistics,
various issues.
(9) Financial depth (FINDP) M2 and GDP from: IMF, Government Finance
Statistics and International Financial Statistics,
various issues.
(10) Civil liberty (POLI) Gastil, “Freedom in the World,” various issues;
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